Note
On A Return to Retro-utopias#
In the eighth century the Japanese
Buddhist thinker Kukai complied a set off religious observances in which he
expanded the range of services on offer to the faithful: not on the basis of
efficacy or fact, but on the basis of more is good. More superstition. Tell
them what they want to hear. Simply, more cures, supplications and spells which
could be sold, practiced and bring comfort to the faithful# not what most would
regard as &enlightenment*.
It is with a
certain amount of sadness that I write this piece, provoked by a friend who
wondered how Dave Graeber*s ideas fitted in with my own on the theoretical
issue of exchange; sadness, because as an admirer of Graeber*s, I liked his
critique of modern culture and found his guiding idea or difference, regarding
two basic forms of exchange, fitted well with my own thought in this area,
indeed seemed to support it# (but on closer examination#). However the major
cause of sadness is David*s premature death 每 both knowledge and activism have
lost immeasurably.
Debt,
of course, means &counter gift*, a means of establishing and perpetuating relations;
relations between one and another or others (like a function, relating two
sets, or outlining an input and output, a translation of another into one, from
one to another or others#). Key is the sense of a link or bond established or
renewed by some form of &exchange*#. But a form of exchange often defined
against the exchange of &equal* values# foregoing the formal equality of two
terms as rational or calculable, as quantifiable exchange or equivalence. The
suggestion is that this form of exchange relation may be non-equivalent, that
it features relations or bonds that are hard to measure, but whose meaning is
clear and often intense#. (self-assertion, contrariness, belonging, community,
emotional, &irrational*, sacrificial, including destructive, both of self and
of others#as well as of objects).
So
our first underlying binary difference is the relation of gift and its
functions contrasted to relations based upon quantifiable calculation 每 and
especially those enforced by force of law. Also present is the generalisation
of this binary into another: community and organization, or personal and
impersonal socialities, Gemeinschaft and
Gesellshaft (after Tönnies, but also
used by Weber and other sociologists). Regarding this opposition, Durkheim,
however, altered the emphasis by suggesting the terms &mechanical* as in
automatic family or kin relations, and &organic*, in the sense of the &organs*
or institutions of society as different kinds of culture (but we should also
note that Gesellschaft can include the
sense of duty to others and other cultural norms not linked to money). Perhaps
not so much a figure counter-posing the extreme opposites of tribal versus
modern societies, but rather of two types of relation or exchange which may
coexist. However we do get the sense of ideal types (again after Weber) in the
contrast of village or community scale democracy with their networks of bonds
and face-to face relations and, at the other pole, the laws and codes of city
life, of mass society, of the institutions of the nation state and state
bureaucracies (whilst this opposition runs through Graeber*s book on debt,
nevertheless it is put aside in the book with David Wengrow for the proposal
that cities also could be equalitarian, structured more like communities). These
are two types of relation which appear to be based upon the difference of gift
exchange and commodity exchange 每 of emotive or &irrational*, perhaps
&intimate*, relations involving belonging and so also a sense of debt or
loyalty as opposed to &rational* type, abstract, relations, perhaps codified in
law (both types may be hierarchical and indeed violent 每 although this is often
forgotten in utopian appropriations of this binary where one term is shaded
good and the other as bad, and indeed left and right alike, find &gift* as
either simply utopic or atavistic, and rational or commodity exchange as either
a fall from equalitarian grace or a liberation from traditional bonds (perhaps
needless to say this author finds the marriage of simplistic binaries, here
social and moral, as a mark of myth-making, ideology or desire).
So
the long history of the above two poles; to which we may add the longer history
(including our prehistory and perhaps our hominid pre-history#) of identity and
relation-making/marking, as variations on &gift* or identity exchange# And of
these to the equally long history of &self as others* (community, tribe,
family, relations of mutual recognition and placing, &the Same*) and of
&objects as others*, the root of Animism as bedrock or seed bed of early human
evolution (pre-Neolithic and so at that time still capable of playing a direct
role in genetic evolution and adaptation#)# This last complex as the long
preparation of the human sense of Nature as other, others, Other# and so also of
Sublime type relations# (recently rediscovered by Romanticism, but always
present in human history as Nature First philosophy 每 the pastoral in the
history or narrative and art, Daoism, Shintoism#). All attested to by our long
art history; including the turn to depicting hierarchy (&Object Right*) in
representation, three and two dimensional, as statue and in pictorial form# so
showing our bond with Nature through our Culture. A culture which &then*
becomes hierarchical#. As with personification, gods/totems, (symbol, thought)
and social difference, gender and generation as the basis of divisions of
labour, with this as the basis of class or caste differentiation, the rise of
priests and kings# and soldiers# (people who want others to feed them#).
Implied
in Graeber*s writings on debt is the contrast of the (ancient or tribal)
village with the (modern) city as models for community and mass society# (a
difference only partly elided in his later work with Wengrow where they try to
show that cities, or questions of scale, are not the problem). This contrast in turn is based upon, or
shows a strong affinity with the difference of gift and commodity - as personal
relations versus market calculations (but we must already note that state
calculations, prescriptions, law etc, are not necessarily linked to &the
market*, rather it may be leader or caste inspired 每 so another kind of
personal bond, more hierarchic, like those of feudalism or caste). Gift is
defined such that social bonds are key# the other mode foregrounds personal
calculation and a &rational* market supposedly working with no interface with
community# Adam Smith, however, posed pure markets as merely ideal or
mathematical entities, not directly applicable to reality 每 and incidentally
used the notions of &market*, or &what people want*, in an anti-feudal,
anti-state-monopoly role# (a point Foucault makes in his work on the eighteenth
century#). So in neither case do we have a deification of &the Market*# this
comes later).
*Markets* really
should be defined as wherever exchange as commodities occurs, that is
quantitative calculation or comparison (&exchange value*) makes exchange of all
for all possible, regardless of means of payment- still based on debt type
(gift type trust but with calculated return) or a comparison to another item,
like shells# (not necessarily themselves present as a medium of exchange rather
a symbolic or mental medium of comparison, one hen two shells, one spade two
shells, therefore hen = spade 每 swop, now or later). And not rhetorically
limited to the negative aspects of modern law-governed, *rationalised*
(artificial, read monopolized) areas of restricted choice, where the law, that
is, the State, protects large companies at the cost to smaller, including the
consumer and producer, the environment and health issues (waste pollution,
health and safety). This later situation is more akin to feudal market
practices or monopolies.
Whilst
many economists are still in thrall to the idea of &barter* as preceding money
(rejected by anthropologists, that is historians, see the work of Mauss, for
example), however Mandel, by contrast, in another historically ambitious work (Marxist Economic Theory, 1962) precisely
following anthropological evidence, only finds for barter as external, as
between groups or tribes, as &silent barter* with &ceremonial gift* or the
extension of internal gift exchange as the result of bonds established between
groups (or maintaining bonds in an extended population or geography). Strangely
when he comes to discuss the origin of money (&universal exchange equivalent*)
he reverts to the a-historical and non-factual traditional economist*s
explanation concerning &barter* and abandons his anthropological history (which
includes pre-monetary quantification in the forms of fines, compensations and
punishments).
In passing it is
interesting to note that, along with foodstuffs, it is tools and ornaments,
that appear to make up the first items of trade: items for work on things; and
items for *labour* on &the self* or identity. The two levels of work on objects
and of work on the subject, as united in sociality, community or culture 每 and
in exchange.
So
not so good, is the book*s central point# Graeber*s somewhat surprising thesis
is that markets seem to come after other forms of exchange. This order of
causality, however, depends on what we call &other forms of exchange*# But
perhaps he simply means to go back to how we distributed what we made and found,
before humans began to exchange things in the sense that parents give to their
children or to each other, or sharing with in &family* units (however
extended)# This is perhaps due to a limited definition of exchange (the above
is usually called &gift exchange*) and indeed a narrow definition of market
exchange (tribes will exchange what they make according to their different
geographies- the geography imposes a division of labour or encourages
differentiation and specialization, further encouraged by the desire to have
something to exchange for the other groups products 每 this then is the basis of
trade). So he seems to mean exchange in human kinship groups and animals as of
the gift/debt type (based upon and reinforcing identity and bonds), which he
extends to relations with other groups (perhaps beginning with some form of
barter before becoming &ritualised*). Yet even with a time lag before any
&counter exchange*, payment of debt or return of object, these latter are still
calculated forms of exchange# and not fixed by anyone outside of the exchange
or &market* relation. This later fixing is perhaps what Graeber means in his
negative portrayal of market exchange; laws of exchange disadvantageous to the
weak (price of goods and price of labour) together with institutionalised debt
and monopoly restrictions or levies as state fixed exchanges as in ancient
societies and feudalism 每 and the introduction of a monetised market (and
taxes) in order to force local populations to labour under colonialism.. But
these later examples are either anti-market measures# They block the
negotiations and ritualized agreements of producers over the exchange value of
their goods# Or they introduce a State controlled &market* ran in the State*s
interest (and often running parallel to the local market, that is local
exchange arrangements or spontaneous trade). So the proper opposition should
again be between gift/debt types of exchange (within the group and at ritual
events such as meeting other groups) perhaps with covert or intuitive
quantification or comparison to ensure fairness, which may be opposed to that
taking place between human/humanoid groups or tribes on an everyday or seasonal
basis as labour and need based 每 and which establishes a market, a place for
exchange, based upon overt forms of comparison or quantification. This is a
matter of use and differentiation of the terms &exchange* and &market*. The
&outside* of these is a rhetorical move, indeed a metaphysical move (see
Bataille and Baudrillard*s appropriation of &gift exchange* for example), as
well as a moral move, better to divide gift from commodity or market exchange,
or tab or debt markets from money markets. Just as Graeber differentiates
between &good* early debt-based societies (gift exchange) and the bad debt of
the history of civilization going back to ancient Sumer (peasants and others
indebted to temples - and now to banks).
Here
we must stop to note the moral binary that appears to underlie the marshaling
of facts and instead points to a biased, or &cherry-picking* approach to
research - as &good exchange* (gift type debt) is opposed to &bad exchange*
(the market together with other kinds of debt). A sleight of hand a bit like
the cooption of &the carnival* by literary studies, notoriously with no evidence
from anthropology or history - unless that of the counter-examples of pogroms
and riot, as aristocratic sons lead feckless young males against all the
others, the aged, women (sexual assault), old women, the handicapped and
disabled, and racial and religious others, like Jews (under the excuse of child
sacrifice and usury). And, in this context, we reminded of the &transgressive*
rituals in anthropology that -whatever their cooption in &60s and &70s art and
performance- have always been conservative# conservational of identity and
institutions (as with tragedy -a hugely transgressive ritual- where we have a
return to law, not its repeal). So internal exchange as dominated or altered,
customized by gift relations, by emotional ties is opposed to its others as
gift versus commodity (as gift or debt versus the labour theory of value, of
time taken and skill required versus family and communal bonds). All this
ignoring the sexual and generational division of labour (a &forgetting* that
extends up to today*s undervaluing of the received definition of &women*s work*
and especially of domestic labour). External exchange, on the other hand, is
usually market-led, based upon labour time and skill, or on monopoly origin or
outlet# and also on the degree of need in combination with the ability to pay
(this was Ricardo*s point) as part of the price, whether expressed in some form
of &tab* or credit arrangement (for regular customers) or in some local cash
equivalent# This latter form of exchange, as noted above, is as old as humanity
and the division (or specialisation) of labour as geographic (fishing, farming,
herding, quarrying, woodcutting). A world of cultural as well as &economic*
manufacturing (domestic) where groups meet, first exchange on the basis of gift
(ritual, including destructive or assertive exchange) then settle into
negotiations over equivalence (barter or a calculated form of exchange where
fairness, that is equivalence is paramount, a calculation usually based upon
labour time)# which is pre-state and state appropriation. Note again the market
as anti-monopoly (from finding and hording, to feudal &customs* barriers as
tax, to the modern mega-company)# monopoly is not market (negotiation of
individuals and communities of producer or even traders, &middle men*) but the
control of markets and so producers (and the ability to benefit from others
work by artificial barriers) by a priesthood (the temple as store, origin of
money as token, as recording list), the laws of the palace (and the city,
ancient and feudal) so by State institutions and other interested parties#
Important
here is, the description of two polar extremes as different kinds of debt
(respectively, the basis of mutual support and the basis for progressive
impoverishment) is a good, but is very different, argument from the positing of
two kinds of exchange (gift type or bond making and commodity type or general
exchange in large scale, even global societies). These are different processes
and whilst the commodity form is clearly important to the market forms of
exchange, to trade and production for an international market, the use of debt
to control or cripple producers or even entire states is quite another matter#
(bad laws cannot be used to damn all laws, rather repeal or reform are the required
action 每 the cry of &no law* is the cry of the strongest, the bully, so
supported by Big Biz as the means to economic domination and Big State in
imperial mode). Likewise the notion of gift/debt as community forming, renewing
and sustaining (&identity exchange* in my terms) as theoretically opposed to
the rational, abstract, commodity form of price calculation is also useful and
clearly correct 每 yet these forms (just like the subject/object, self/others
and subjective/objective, that is diremptive, aspects of being human and the
schism in our culture this generates) are found intertwined and co-dependent.
Rather than demonizing one (reason and the commodity) and &romanticising* the
other (gift/debt) as the source of redemption on earth, better would be to
describe objectively the positive and negative aspects of both &types* of
exchange, and point out their worst practices: exclusion and pogroms/ethnic
cleansing as a destructive by-product of the sacrificial or gift/bond form
(especially present when communities felt they are under threat, or mobilized
by unscrupulous &leaders*); and indebtedness in the poor (incited by the market
at the behest of state and banking policies upheld by law and for the interest
of managerial/speculative, read &financial*, desire).
#the above process
of &debt-robbery* as a parallel with the origins (as far as we can recover
them) of the state and its institutions (or of their worst aspects, as all
cities, early city states, appear to require state institutions, as does mass
society today) in the recognition and assertion by some priests, rulers,
administrators, and soldiers that they were no longer willing to work# However
the two Davids* late work suggests that early cities may have been more
egalitarian than we assumed 每 so hinting at a greater range of choice in the
construction of our own societies 每 let us hope that this is true, but, be that
as it may, modern societies seem to tend towards institutionalised inequality
(with the relative exception of post-World War Two capitalism till the 1980s
每returning with the onset of post-industilisation and neo-classical economic
strategy- and those societies, usually called &social democratic* that continue
to manage wealth redistribution). The historical question, as with the modern
options for fiscal and economic reform, require further research.
Can
one move from archeological evidence to generalisations about equality? In
common with most commentators I remain to be convinced (however this
commentary, as the reader will have noted, is theoretical and not empirical).
Much depends upon how we define &equality* (as with &class* or social
differentiation as hierarchy and labour role). Other evidence appears to show
the opposite 每 especially if we look at &actually existing* tribal societies#
and to be fair Wengrow in particular does not espouse the &primitive equality*
thesis.
By contrast to
those who plumb for the Neolithic revolution as the birth of &inequality* as of
so many other human traditions and institutions, Gordon Childe seems to argue
that the &metallurgical revolution* (the move to Copper and Bronze) as the
moment of the ascendancy of the State (due to the trade required to import
metals#).
So
it is that after a long utopian moment (stretching from Morgan and Marx to
Douglas and now at least implicit in Graeber), many, perhaps most, commentators
(Diamond and Harari are only the most famous) now regard tribal societies as
structurally violent (Diamond also notes things we can learn from such
societies). Harari, among many others who hold this view, too is a
&progressivist* regarding recent human history# and in this respect we may note
many others involved in research on the economy and on the (usually related)
role of education. In fact, all this somewhat embarrassingly parallels the
1960s discovery of chimp societies as &one with nature* and so with each other
in community and so suitable food for further utopian fantasy: further research
showed rather the opposite - with evidence of systematic violence, kidnapping, rape,
even cannibalism, notably among groups of young males (comparisons to
Isis/Deash anyone#). We need to learn from the facts and not our fantasies.
Regarding
class and tribe# Another blind spot appears in many commentators when it comes
to classifying social differences within tribal forms: class is supposed not to
exist (can we seriously be surprised when we cannot find the same class
structures as we have in industrial societies, in tribal societies#)? However,
&class* in tribal societies is: captured slaves and the differences of
generation and gender, with their division of labour (economic and therefore
&class* by any other name 每 a difference often augmented by residence) then
there is the status of powerful families, kin groups or clans# (the chief*s).
Similarly any supposed peaceful coexistence of &man and nature* and &man with
man* (sic) is counter-posed by present data regarding young males and war in
tribal societies - with high attrition rates apparently the rule. Their inner
or group cooperation is countered by a general competition with all others#with
high mortality rates as the result. Similarly, regarding the evidence
pertaining to gender and generation and violence (&domestic violence*) 每 also
decidedly non-utopic in tribal societies. Note that FGM, often attributed to
Islam along with sex bias, was in fact inherited from earlier tribal practice#
just as were traditional Jewish customs regarding gender status# and, indeed,
but not of tribal origin, rather as reconstituted out of the ruins of the Roman
empire, traditional Christian practice (and finally then these are all feudal
religions 每 regardless of their origins or founding tenets with their emphasis
on community and forgiveness). And in fact the balance of the evidence suggests
that all inner cooperation, community-type societies are, on closer
examination, divided and hierarchical - just not quite the way modern societies
are# (I am reminded of a play, &Mary Barnes* by David Edgar, concerning mental
health, therapy and group practice, where received hierarchies 每doctor and
patient, familial, education as social status, etc.- are said to be replaced by
a new equalitarian interrelation, relations of equality in communication, but
where, in fact, as the play shows very clearly, the &new order* is based on
&new* hierarchies based on assertiveness and gender# and yes, the difference of
the roles of doctor 每&the one who knows* and patient, are still there 每 as they
are in the &therapeutics* of *Who is afraid of Virginia Woolf*).
Surprisingly
often (or not, if one finds diremption as foundational in human experience) it
is the sense of *from inside* and &from outside* that is found to be key in
organising conceptual difference and particularly moral difference, and so
(unsurprisingly) appears in the case of the opposition of gift and commodity.
An organization which is also a form of rhetoric (this form is found in much
advanced rhetoric such as &deconstruction*). The gift relation is not only read
as prior, but also as &in* as more intimate and &natural* (and again,
unsurprisingly these terms are often found together). Now whilst this is
probably right, both historically and in terms in intimate relations and
identity assertiveness (of community as of individual), today the two poles of
exchange are hopelessly intertwined in modern mass consumption or mass
commodity exchange. Yet all are still exchanges which can be ameliorated, when
appropriate, by social bonds of debt and intimacy (and, yes, social, kinship
and familial hierarchies)# But still present as intuited or based upon the
experience of labour time (whence the value of giving, the ground of
comparison, as with its apparent opposite, assertive expenditure) and of desire
and scarcity. Witness destructive exchange and the awareness of unequal
exchange as precisely either noted, recognized (as a problem), or deliberately
used as a form of subject (&chief*) or community assertion# This latter gesture
most definitely requiring some notion of the (exchange) value of the goods in
question#. (true of both fairness or equity and of &showing-off* or status
claiming). The quantitative or comparative value thesis as implied in internal
exchanges (we do know the value in labour or time, or perhaps as compared to
other exchanges, other objects, of the object or service in question, and
either ignore this knowledge as inappropriate or use it to show our valuing of
the recipient, or in order to suggest the degree of debt the recipient is
placed in). This sense of the labour or exchange value of an object or service
is however required in external exchanges 每 until codified by relationships
(marriage/alliance) or trade type treaty (based on the commodity as made for
exchange and some notion of equivalence, quantitative, but not necessarily
money based).
The
appeal to Nature, to a &before*, to a fall from grace# is perhaps the oldest
trope (myth of pastoral to &nature first* philosophies (Plato, Daoism)# to
Romanticism and its modern wake as the religion of intellectuals, artists and
oppositional thought of all stripes# and so of the populisms# Nature as court
of final appeal: a &before*, before proof, so unverifiable# &outside* in all
senses, so deemed universal (community) or maintaining an &eternal truth*,
uprooted only by a pernicious wrong turn# or automatic process into competition
and domination (that will in the end, and in both cases, somehow, revert to its
original pattern# but on a higher level of &synthesis*#). Greaber, as an
anarchist, prefers voluntarism together with the former (the wrong historical
turn), while the Marxists or economic determinists prefer the later (the
automatic necessity of the fall into class as well as, of course, its
redemption). Both, however, are in thrall to tropes or models of &the Fall*;
models that permit -or make unassailable- what would otherwise be fantasy# the
final redemptive (religious or &secularised* Hegelian) step. Better a
rationally presented mix of policies of cooperation, competition and reform
based upon the here and now#
Rediscovering
lost or hidden essence# (again). So here we are still with Romantic metaphysics
or ideology# In this respect we might further note that, again, we see the love
of, the desire for, the restriction of thought to a single cause or dominant
(sic) factor (as one side of a simple binary) as opposed to the general
description of all the factors or elements involved. Instruction for this model
might read as follows: find a binary; organize into a fall-redemption type
narrative - and you have a &new* secular religion (most romantic ideology fits
this pattern). On the other hand, a diremptive model (where the forces in
question are grouped into a binary opposition, precisely by their actual
opposition), by contrast would suggest irreducible agon or conflict without &synthesis* 每 alleviated by
representative, reforming, and reformable, institutions (municipal, regional,
national and international). To refuse the mediation of the latter is to return
to the reign of the bully (the biggest dog in the room).
Note
on diremption# and binaries in thought. First it is important to note that
simple binaries function as clear sign of ideology (&in the bad sense*). Very
rarely are things that simple# like class or social difference. Or so
separable# as with gift and commodity or cooperation and competition (or
community and mass society (or Community versus the State#)). Sex is binary
(the brute physical nature): but gender is not, as it consists of a variety of
differing role plays and associations according to tradition and geography. So
the choice of &sex* (actually gender role) is &non-binary* is plural# &Sex*
then is binary by nature (but the concepts used to think it are cultural#): but
&gender* is ideology (in the good or descriptive sense)# varied and various
across cultures. Diremption too is binary, &the& irreducible difference, which
is perhaps the foundation of all our (conceptual, cultural) binaries, as it is
the &non-foundation* on which we are ourselves appear to be built. Built as
individuals (each with-in our own &eternal present*, our on-going subjective
experience) and collectively as the sum of our cultural products; with subject
and object, subjective and objective, and subject and other (together with self
as other as object) all, as in the experience of the individual, in permanent
oscillation. Moreover a constitutive diremption reproducing its divisions in
thought and philosophy (fact/ value, indicative/ subjective, use/ mention,
general/ particular, to name but a few 每 with mathematics after Gödel appearing
as subject-utilised natural language as founding and then employing,
&undermining*, the man-made object languages of science and logic). In the
arts, we clearly have the clash of subject and object point of view as
&narrative directions* (left/right) and left/right placement within the frame
as &object right* (in the written or verbal arts appearing as &subjective*
character and &objective* narrative point of view). In the social sciences
(assertive/descriptive, gift/commodity, irrational/rational, identity or
&non-equivalent* exchange and objective or exchange based upon quantitative
equivalence) - providing our &join* to others 每 our identity, individual and
collective and multi-leveled or plural. Whilst in the physical sciences
(quantum/classical, positional /universal, the restricted human view and the
general God*s eye view) where, to reverse the terms just employed, the
restrictive view of the classical model is augmented (but not replaced by, nor
fused with) its incommensurable twin, into a general model; more inclusive 每and
more empirical and useful, than the classical, &one-field*, model alone. The
difference running through &utopia and fall* redemption type models of human
evolution, that is, the moralized difference of Community versus State or state
institutions, or of gift type social and emotive identity bonds and the
exchanges they elicit versus objective economic exchanges based only on
quantitative equivalence or the market or reason, are just too simplistic to do
reality credit# The opposition of these (to be sure a moral, political, even
religious, opposition 每 &Good v Evil*) are what was the problem with the human
sciences, their evolution appears much more as one of co-dependency or fusion
(or, in their analysis and description, of alternation). The problem only becomes
worse when we add on a definitively religious model of fall and redemption.
And as we see from
the above our (and Graeber and Wengrow*s) guiding opposition is precisely that
of identity exchange and rational equivalence, as taking the mutually exclusive
but also mutually dependent roles of subjective and objective. The diremption*s
social product or extrapolation. As &both# and* replaces &either# or.*
Indeed,
&the Fall*, as totalizing model, explains everything, predicts everything# So
if old, of ancient origin, this point of origin must be the real truth of
something - its real point. Suggesting also a return to this truth at a later
date# (redemption, soteriology, oracular); and so we note also the role of
*origins* as &the secret*, the myth of origins (again featuring a
simplification that would explain everything, &all our problems*) as the
process explained, as genealogy# But real genealogies are not fixed, are not a
moment of &being*, rather a process, &becoming*, with a sequence of appropriations
or transformations as the process of an &object*s* evolution, and also (insofar
as separable) its symbolic appropriation, as in its history of interpretation,
understanding or linguistic, scientific description # Including the latest, by
group (of scientists, with collective witness as constituting the realm we call
&objective*) and by a given individual (perhaps one of the witnesses) as actual
embeddedness or &embodiment* or &host* in space/time# (&your*/*our*/*my*
eternal present &now*- in relation to its objects and others, including self as
object, all in perpetual oscillation - a process set in motion by diremption).
*
Conclusion#
The assertion of the values of community (including, equality and care, health and
education), is better performed on the basis of possibility and will (political
will), and so based upon achievable, practical ends (on &the left*, Thomas
Pickerty*s work alone stands out here) and not on the basis of a proclaimed
lost essence, or pre-lapsarian unity, a hidden essence waiting to be discovered
(in nature, our nature, our inner nature#) 每 but based finally only on wish
fulfillment. A &solution* which, when failing, then requires a scapegoat# (a
reversion to the solution of community or gift based societies or social
relations# where the sacrifice of others, as &gift*, is seen a key to
redemption and cure) this latter is an aspect ignored by many such theorists
(as often is the role of gender and generational difference and &race*). The gift
or bond or debt based relation (identity exchange) we find has never left us;
but remains as a foundation of identity and community 每for better or for worse-
as it does as one foundation (the symbolic use value) of mass commodity
exchange or mass consumption (where all can have goods and services, not just
the few# and where the &return* to a prior situation, what turns out to be a
bureaucratic kind of feudalism, or the situation of early industrial
capitalism, is what requires resisting#).
*
Copyright Peter Nesteruk, 2022